Reviews:


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In his later years Charles Seeger (1886–1979) spent quite a bit of time thinking about the nature of musical knowledge, especially as it was manifested across the musical cultures of the world. As Seeger saw it, musicology lagged far behind other disciplines—especially the sciences—in coming to terms with this knowledge.

In comparison with the most admired scholarly disciplines of the twentieth century Western World, musicology has only tardily formed concepts of its total field, or universe, and of its lowest common denominator. And these concepts, such as they are, have not yet made a dent upon the “excessive historicism” still entrenched in academic fortresses. Meanwhile, the natural and social sciences have advanced from positions of main reliance upon analytical techniques to bold syntheses of universal proportions, while in musicology, even mention of synthesis is not quite respectable. It should not be, but probably is, necessary to point out that except within a universal conceptual frame and in terms of a lowest common denominator, analysis is hazardous.¹

In the remainder of the short article this paragraph introduces, Seeger considers first the analysis of musical facts (that is, a scientific account of the sounding materials of music, starting from the “lowest common denominators”) and then the analysis of musical values (the things that influence our use of musical facts). As Seeger sees it, musical facts have long been subject to analysis by electronic devices, which early in the century revealed the connection between the periodic structures of rhythm and frequency. At the time he wrote, musical values had not been subject to a similar sort of analysis, but given the framework he outlined in the article and progress in psychology and cybernetics Seeger believed that research institutions would one day be able to perform computational analyses on the entirety of music—both facts and values. “Eventually,” he wrote, “large archives may insert incoming tapes and films at one end of a machine and extract in a few minutes from the other a conventional skeleton notation, a conventionally lettered word-text, any kind of sophisticated notation or graph, a phonetic word-text or visible speech, and a complete catalogue card with as many subject-headings as required for either verbal or melodic indexing.”²

One can see in the trajectory of this argument all the familiar landmarks of Seeger’s ideas about musical knowledge. Seeger constantly strove to have the widest range of phenomena included under the rubric “music,” gathering together not only music from all human cultures, in all their diverse manifestations, but also the ways music was produced (through composition, improvisation, and performance) and the ways it was listened to (casually, raptly, and ritually). And within any given set of musical practices Seeger wanted to include not only musical materials, but also peoples’ attitudes toward and feelings about how these materials might be organized or, once organized, what the music meant to them. This combination of musical facts and values was what made up Seeger’s unitary field, and what he believed to be the proper object of musicology. It was this that he hoped to study with his fantastic computational machine, and it was in studying the unitary field that Seeger dreamed musicology might achieve something to rival science.

This is Charles Seeger the musicologist, but as Taylor Greer shows in his study of Seeger’s musical thought, the

¹ Seeger 1968, 33.
² Seeger 1968, 38.
musicologist was mightily influenced by Charles Seeger the composer. Or, perhaps more accurately, Seeger’s activities as a composer and teacher of composition led him to inquire into the foundations of both musical thought and musical material. For instance, here is Seeger in his composition treatise Tradition and Experiment in the New Music: “If we are to hear a new music comparable to the music of Palestrina, Bach, and Beethoven, it will be less through a musical pre-Raphaelite movement or a timorous anti-intellectualism than through a systematic overhauling of all the elements in the situation—materials, methods, and values.”

It is, of course, this same attention to “all of the elements in the situation” that we can see in Seeger’s unitary field theory, and indeed in all his published writings.

Most of the manuscript for Tradition and Experiment in the New Music was written, with the collaboration of Ruth Crawford, during the early 1930s, but behind it were two decades of hard thinking about the challenges of knowing music. Greer argues that Seeger’s thought in the early part of the century was framed by a philosophy of music derived from his encounters with the writings of Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Ralph Barton Perry, and others. Key to this philosophy was the notion of mediating between ideological extremes or diametrically opposed concepts—thinking about music was thus, in Greer’s terms, a question of balance. Greer proposes that Seeger’s philosophy of music shaped his views on composition and on all aspects of music and that, even though Seeger started developing this philosophy while still in his thirties, it sustained him into his nineties. Indeed, Greer’s thesis is that Seeger’s central contribution to the field of music was his aesthetic philosophy.

Intuition, for instance, was of singular importance to Seeger: he believed it was possible to know music without the intervention of language or rational thought. This approach to knowledge resembles that of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941). The resemblance, together with Bergson’s wide popularity in the early years of the twentieth century and Seeger’s almost certain encounter with synopses of his ideas, leads Greer to suggest Bergson as one source of Seeger’s thought. The suggestion is a persuasive one: Bergson’s emphasis on intuition as a direct form of knowledge was an attractive alternative to the thoroughgoing rationalism prevalent in German and English philosophy. Bergson also held that the intuition of the artist was more direct than that of the non–artist, and yielded a perspective that was incompatible with conventional language. An incompatibility of this sort was one Seeger worried over and celebrated throughout his writings. In “Toward an Establishment of the Study of Musicology in America,” a manuscript written around 1913, Seeger observed that “music is not founded upon language or upon language studies. But its conduct in our day depends customarily on

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3 Seeger 1994, 52. Different versions of the manuscript exist under different titles; that adopted in Seeger 1994 is Tradition and Experiment in (the New) Music. I have omitted the parentheses in the following for the sake of simplicity.

4 Pescatello 1992, 44–49.
an extensive use of language.” Nearly sixty years later he wrote that “as musicians, we know that music communicates something that speech does not.” These notions are, of course, at the heart of what Seeger called the “linguocentric predicament”—the need to use language to describe something that is not language. But they also reflect a steadfast belief that musicians have “direct music knowledge and music feeling beyond that of non-musicians.” As did Bergson, Seeger placed intuition against rationality, but in Seeger’s rendering music, together with other art forms, was the domain of intuition, and language the domain of rationality.

Betrand Russell (1872–1970) was another important influence on Seeger. The influence came, however, not from the Russell of *Principia Mathematica*—although Seeger admired the ambitions of that work, and hoped to write a *Principia Musicologica* of his own—but from the more popular philosopher who, in 1914, published the essay “Mysticism and Logic.” Although Russell’s essay mounts an attack on the notion of intuition set forth in Bergson’s philosophy, it also attempts to make a place for both intuition and reason within a larger view of knowledge.

Bergson, under the name of “intuition,” has raised instinct to the position of sole arbiter of metaphysical truth. But in fact the opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new.

Greer argues that the balance between intuition and reason advocated by Russell had a telling effect on Seeger; indeed, Seeger included Russell’s *Mysticism and Logic* on the reading list for the introduction to musicology course that he taught at Berkeley in the early years of the century (23). And the question of the balance between intuition and reason is prominent in the opening of *Tradition and Experiment in the New Music*:

We may grant that there is much about the art of composition that cannot be reasoned about—much that cannot even be spoken about in any way. But we also hold that there are certain aspects of it that can be, and—in view of the customs of our day—that must be, organized in the most rigorously logical manner possible.

It also appears that Russell’s partial valorization of mysticism may have left its traces on Seeger’s thought, emboldening him to emphasize steadfastly the mysterious in music and to stress the importance of quasi-mystical inner experience.

A third influence comes from the philosophical study of value. All of Seeger’s writings about musical knowledge—whether that knowledge was in the service of composition or scholarship—eventually touched on the issue of value. For Seeger, value was key to understanding why humans made music, and it was key to any account of why and how music should be worthy of our attention. Value was also connected to the ethical concerns that increasingly occupied Seeger after World War I and during the Great Depression, and that led him to advocate an extension of the domain of musicology beyond the Western canon. Greer suggests that key

5 Quoted in Pescatello 1992, 56. See also Seeger 1924, 247: “To the musician, *music is music*. Music is not something else, whether it be expressed by one word or a host of them.”


7 See, for instance, Seeger 1977c, 133: “How can we expect to solve all problems in terms of the biggest problem of all—that of the linguocentric predicament—is quite a problem. As a problem, I believe it is insoluble.” For a more sustained consideration, see Seeger 1977a. There, on p. 188, Seeger observes, “Biologically, speech—a cultural invention—is the most dangerous invention of man.”

8 Seeger 1977c, 105.


10 Russell 1914.


12 Seeger 1994, 52.

13 On the mysterious in music see Seeger 1924, 244; on the importance of quasi-mystical inner experience see Seeger 1977a, 183.
to shaping Seeger’s view of the study of values were the writings of Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957). Perry, who taught philosophy at Harvard, delivered a series of lectures at Berkeley in the first half of 1918, at least some of which Seeger attended (24). The exposure opened Seeger’s eyes to the principled study of value (or axiology), which was a central part of Perry’s philosophical project. But while Seeger became enthusiastic about the study of value he did not become systematic: “of all the ideas Seeger borrowed from contemporary developments in philosophy,” observes Greer, “the theory of axiology was the one to which he was the least loyal” (74). While it appears that Seeger absorbed the breadth and ambition of Perry’s approach to axiology, especially in its aspirations to a thoroughly scientific study, he did not adopt its methodology, preferring to substitute for science broad but unsystematic accounts of what fell under the rubric of value.

Although Greer considers similarities between Seeger’s thought and that of a number of other philosophers in his reconstruction of the bases of Seeger’s philosophy of music, in the end it is Bergson, Russell, and Perry who loom largest on the intellectual horizon. It seems clear that Seeger, one of the most philosophical of twentieth-century musicologists, did not develop his ideas in a vacuum. It also seems clear that his success in bringing the power of contemporary philosophy to bear on the study of basic aspects of music convinced Seeger that musicology could become more than simply a casual humanistic bagatelle, for in meeting the challenges posed by philosophers musicologists could finally do justice to their discipline.

Greer concludes the first part of his study with a consideration of the theory of criticism Seeger laid out in the second chapter of Tradition and Experiment in the New Music. Seeger, adopting a discursive tone, elaborates fourteen principles, beginning with an assertion about the relativity of value and touching on everything from musical style to the experience of love and God. Greer reduces Seeger’s sprawling exposition to three essential principles:

I. The intuition of aesthetic value, which forms the basis of impressionistic criticism, cannot be qualified or analyzed into parts. It is either present as a whole or it is not.

II. Criticism aims at a relative balance between two opposing mental faculties, intuition and reason, and the corresponding types of criticism, impressionistic and scientific. These faculties not only complement each other, but one may actually influence how the other proceeds.

III. The process by which the critical mediation proposed in principle two comes about is itself a series of mediations between opposites: the individual’s taste versus society’s taste; the historical study of musical style vs. the current development of composition; and the ethical conception of music, both past and present vs. the scientific analysis of musical phenomena. The final result of all these mediations is a judgment of musical value. (83)

Evident in this summary is the influence of Bergson (in the centrality of intuition to the first principle), Russell (in the balance between intuition and reason in principle two), and Perry (in the thoroughgoing treatment of value in principle three). Although Greer goes on to consider other aspects of Seeger’s fourteen original principles, what is perhaps most striking is simply the inclusion of an overview of criticism in the introductory material of a volume nominally dedicated to the study of composition. This is, on the other hand, a deliberately self-conscious gesture on Seeger’s part: he was completely sincere in his belief that a truly new music would require “a systematic overhauling of all the elements in the situation—materials, methods, and values.” A thorough consideration of how value was assessed was necessary if the new music was to be anything more than a happy accident. On the other hand, by the time he wrote Tradition and Experiment in the New Music Seeger had become convinced that the study of music required a broader framework. Failing a careful consideration of the bases of musical communication, and of the differences as well as the homologies between music and language, music would never be allowed the autonomy which was its right and its need.14

14 Seeger 1924, 250.
The second part of Greer’s study explores in detail how Seeger’s philosophy of music was manifested in his music criticism, teaching of composition, and ideas about musicology. Seeger did not produce a large volume of critical writing, but notable are reviews of compositions by Carl Ruggles, Henry Cowell, and Ruth Crawford. In each of these reviews Seeger struggled to put his ideas about criticism into practice at the same time he endeavored to advance the cause of new music. His critiques thus take the shape of overall enthusiasm for each composer’s contributions, tempered by well-placed and reasoned critical remarks. Greer argues that one of Seeger’s principal aims in these reviews is to assign value according to the degree to which each composer achieved the synthesis of mystical faith and rational thought Seeger held as ideal, and which was central to his philosophy (119).

Greer devotes the longest chapter in his study to the ideas about composition Seeger advanced in Tradition and Experiment in the New Music. Seeger’s main purpose there was to set forth the first principles of composition (which, of course, included the ideas about criticism discussed above). With respect to the physical materials of music, Seeger’s point of departure is the continuum between the frequencies we hear as pitch and the regular beats of rhythm. Citing Dayton Clarence Miller’s The Science of Musical Sound (1916), Seeger observes that we accept as musical tones frequencies in the range of 24 to 4,138 cycles per second. Below 24 cycles per second: "they cease to be accepted as musical tone and become a kind of flicker or rapid tattoo. When they slow down to about 16 per second, they begin to be accepted as beats, and so as material for musical rhythm. . . . Thus, while from a physical viewpoint the comparatively high frequency of pitch is accepted as pitch and the comparatively low as rhythm, there is a small median section or gap [occupied by the flicker or rapid tattoo] that is not, at present, musical material at all. This divides the single variable of the frequency scale (mere occurrence in time-space) into the two variables of pitch of tone and tempo (speed of beat) of rhythm, each of which has its high, medium, and low, whose serial sequence we may observe as increase in frequency constancy in frequency decrease in frequency." 15

For Seeger, then, the most basic materials of music, pitch and tempo, are manifestations of the same physical phenomenon, that is, periodic vibrations of a sounding body. He then extends this perspective by taking into account amplitude, which yields a total of six variables divided into two groups: tone (which exhibits pitch, loudness, and timbre), and rhythm (which exhibits tempo, accent, and proportion). 16 Although the terms used for these six variables are all familiar from musical practice, Seeger maintains that they are not yet music. For music to be created members of some culture must manipulate them in some way. Thus the pitch of a tone may be increased, kept the same, or decreased, as may its loudness and timbre. The first manipulation is called tension; the second variously tonicity, rest, or poise; and the third relaxation. In Seeger’s scheme, were all three of the tone variables subjected to tension, for instance, the tone would rise in pitch, become louder, and sound “warmer;” were the beat variables subjected to tension, the beat would become faster, stronger, and its proportion would be divided. 17

This summary by no means exhausts the topics covered under Seeger’s consideration of the basic materials of music, but it gives a sense of the broad and systematic approach to musical materials he hoped to establish. Greer, for his part, gives this approach a thorough review, treating in some detail Seeger’s extension of the concept of dissonance beyond the domain of pitch, and showing how these concepts can be seen at work in the third movement of Ruth Crawford’s String Quartet (131–44).

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15 Seeger 1994, 84; emphasis as in original. In a diagram on p. 85 Seeger puts the lower limit of audibility at 32 cps.
16 Seeger 1994, 85–86.
Greer also discusses other innovative ideas Seeger proposed in *Tradition and Experiment in the New Music*, including a somewhat idiosyncratic idea of harmonic dualism which was pressed into service as a justification for harmonic adventures by Schoenberg and Ruggles and a catalogue of contour types for basic melodic elements. The latter represents perhaps the earliest generalized theory of contour in the twentieth century. In his exposition, Seeger revives the term “neume” for the basic contour shapes made by successions of two and three different pitches, and provides a complete inventory of all the possibilities. And, in keeping with the approach he adopted in his consideration of the basic materials of music, he extends this theory of contour to dynamics and rhythm.

Greer’s extended discussion of Seeger’s *Tradition and Experiment in the New Music* will hold perhaps the most interest for music theorists. Greer not only sets out Seeger’s compositional theory, and its implications, much more clearly than Seeger himself did, but he also provides analytical elaborations of key points of the theory. For those interested in the history of music theory, Greer also reviews some of the important antecedents for and influences on Seeger’s treatise and its relationship to similar treatises by Joseph Yasser, Joseph Schillinger, and Henry Cowell.

Seeger made his final revisions to *Tradition and Experiment in the New Music* in September of 1931 and then set the work aside. He soon ceased teaching composition (having stopped composing around 1918) and subsequently dedicated himself to other musical activities, including the founding of the American Musicological Society in 1934 with Schillinger, Yasser, Carl Engel, Gustave Reese, Oliver Strunk, and a number of others, a growing interest in folk music, employment in the New Deal Resettlement Administration, subsequent employment with the Pan American Union and Organization of American States, development of the melograph during the 1950s, participation in the establishment of the Society for Ethnomusicology in 1956, and activities as a researcher at the Institute of Ethnomusicology at UCLA from 1961 to 1971. As a consequence of the relative obscurity of Seeger’s work in composition and his prominence in these latter activities, Seeger’s reputation became one largely associated with his work in musicology, folk music, and ethnomusicology. In the final chapter of his study, Greer turns to the vision of musicology Seeger set forth in his later work, and its connection with the philosophy of music developed in his earlier work.

Greer identifies three prominent themes in Seeger’s essays on the field of musicology. The first is a belief that musicology depends on a balanced approach to the various concerns of the musicologist. Musicology thus involved not only a discovery of the fundamental principles of music, but also the system of thought through which this discovery was made. The second theme is manifested as an aspiration toward a universal scheme of musicology applicable to a broad range of cultures and repertoires. Seeger’s long-standing interest in both contemporary composition and folk music demanded that he look beyond the Western canon in his descriptions of the field of inquiry. The final theme is less a trope of argument and more a developmental thread: in his successive considerations of musicology, the broad-ranging inquiry into fundamentals that marked Seeger’s earliest work gradually assumed less importance, making room for more of an emphasis on historical inquiry.

The grand plans Seeger wove from these themes have their precedent, of course, in work by Guido Adler and others, and Greer reviews this work in the first part of the chapter. What sets Seeger’s schemes apart, however, is not only their ambition, but his persistence with them. Indeed, his...
musings on the proper structure for musicological inquiry, drawing inspiration not only from previous synoptic schemes but also pulling in ideas from linguistics, anthropology, and physics, and accompanied by any number of dense diagrams, span more than half a century. Greer compares the effect of the accreted schemes that resulted to a palimpsest, and as one peruses the various plans one does get the sense that Seeger was constantly rewriting a single basic plan, bringing new materials on board when it seemed they might help in the ongoing construction of the whole, jettisoning others after they had served their purpose. Greer argues that these efforts were hampered by two flaws. On the one hand, Seeger persistently underestimated the value of studying the past, making little room for historical musicology within his various schemes. On the other hand, Seeger constantly over-estimated the importance of studying the present, acting at times as though contemporary practices emerged ex nihilo (221).

Greer suggests that Seeger’s various schemes for the structure of musicology are best viewed as records of his intellectual journeys. Likening these schemes to maps, Greer notes that “the truly challenging cartographic questions within the landscape of musicology involve finding where and how the various provinces of music history, criticism, and compositional theory meet” (222). Throughout his career Seeger continually drew and re-drew maps of this terrain, ever hoping to find a course through its contours that would convince both himself and others.

A QUESTION OF BALANCE

Seeger’s writings ranged far and wide, spanned most of the twentieth century, and are remarkable for their labored prose style and hermeticism, either obscuring or ignoring their sources in the work of earlier writers or in that of Seeger himself. Greer has deftly managed to untangle the snarls in the thought behind this writing, discovering the hidden strands that Seeger drew on and weaving the whole into a more complete and more coherent tapestry than Seeger ever managed to produce. Greer accomplishes this singular feat by stretching these threads across the frame of an aesthetic philosophy that Seeger never explicitly assembled, but that can be seen to have informed his work. One comes away with a new way of reading Seeger, and a new way of appreciating his influence on twentieth-century musicology.

Yet it could be argued that the principal strength of Greer’s book—reading Seeger through the lens of a philosophy of music—is also its main weakness. The principles of the philosophy—a faith in intuition, a desire for balance, and a foregrounding of value—are general enough that they can be found almost everywhere. For example, Seeger, in his discussion in Tradition and Experiment in the New Music of the six variables of basic materials (pitch, loudness, timbre, tempo, accent, and proportion) distinguishes their musical character as either a “function” (which can scientifically analyzed) or a “resource” (which is subject to the will of the composer). Greer comments:

The distinction between “function” and “resource” illustrates how deeply Bergson’s intuitionist assumptions influenced Seeger’s thinking. For instance, the term “resource” is less an analytical category than a symbolic protest against scientific analysis altogether. Indeed, to insist that no musical parameter can be separated from any other is a clear affirmation of the intuitionist creed. Yet, in part 1 of the treatise Seeger lavishes more attention on the consequences of separating the six musical parameters than he does on treating them as a single intuitive whole. In fact, his desire to use theoretical investigation as a means of generating new ideas for composition shows the degree to which Bertrand Russell’s ideal of mediation inspired Seeger’s unusual approach toward basic musical materials (131).

It might be argued, however, that Seeger is simply trying to distinguish between the properties of musical sound that are subject to scientific analysis (“function”) and the properties of musical sound with which composers are occupied (“resource”), and that no larger philosophical program is involved.

Greer also proposes that one of the themes of Seeger’s musico-
logical writings is a quest for a balance between opposing
forces (as noted above), but the issue of balance may be not
so much philosophical as strategic. For instance, in his early
article on the principles of musicology (and with the linguo-
centric predicament in mind), Seeger observes that “the lack
of balance introduced into musicology by the choice of in-
strument (language) may be compensated for by the pre-
dominance of a musical point of view.”21 “Balance” here could
be construed as less a matter of mediating between intuition
and rationality and more a matter of recognizing the limita-
tions of describing something that is not language in terms
of language. Again, Seeger’s thought about the structure of
musicology changed in subtle ways over the course of his
life, but one could see the issue of balance in his later writ-
ings not as a matter of resolving opposed forces but as a
matter of accommodating the differences between the two
modes of expression—language and music—engaged by
musicology.

One thing that tends to be obscured by Greer’s interpre-
tation of Seeger’s work in terms of philosophical principles is
Seeger’s love of system as system. Seeger’s comprehensive ac-
count of musical materials in Tradition and Experiment in the
New Music is not dissimilar from Ernst Bacon’s exhaustive
account of scale types and harmonic types in his exploration
of compositional resources,22 or from Serge Taneev’s sweep-
ing survey of contrapuntal possibilities.23 The point is not
that Seeger would have known either Bacon’s or Taneev’s
work—there is no indication that he did—but that his own
ruminations about composition began around the same time,
and may be guided by the intellectual climate and love of
system building all three authors shared, rather than by a set
of philosophical precepts. Yet these reservations aside, Greer’s
contribution to our understanding of Seeger’s thought, and
especially the context behind Seeger’s near-obsession with
the topic of value, should not be underestimated.

Charles Seeger had high hopes for the discipline of musi-
cology. His vision for what the field might become was all
too often obscured by impenetrable prose, and by our lack of
familiarity with the intellectual framework for his ideas (a
framework that extended to unpublished manuscripts and
unnamed influences). Taylor Greer’s study is a first step tow-
ward gaining familiarity with this framework, the better to
understand how musicology might yet fulfill Seeger’s vision.

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